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Published 2009 | Published
Book Section - Chapter Open

Bayesian Model of Behaviour in Economic Games

Abstract

Classical game theoretic approaches that make strong rationality assumptions have difficulty modeling human behaviour in economic games. We investigate the role of finite levels of iterated reasoning and non-selfish utility functions in a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process model that incorporates game theoretic notions of interactivity. Our generative model captures a broad class of characteristic behaviours in a multi-round Investor-Trustee game. We invert the generative process for a recognition model that is used to classify 200 subjects playing this game against randomly matched opponents.

Additional Information

We thank Wako Yoshida, Karl Friston and Terry Lohrenz for useful discussions.

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Created:
August 20, 2023
Modified:
January 13, 2024