Published 2009
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Bayesian Model of Behaviour in Economic Games
Abstract
Classical game theoretic approaches that make strong rationality assumptions have difficulty modeling human behaviour in economic games. We investigate the role of finite levels of iterated reasoning and non-selfish utility functions in a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process model that incorporates game theoretic notions of interactivity. Our generative model captures a broad class of characteristic behaviours in a multi-round Investor-Trustee game. We invert the generative process for a recognition model that is used to classify 200 subjects playing this game against randomly matched opponents.
Additional Information
We thank Wako Yoshida, Karl Friston and Terry Lohrenz for useful discussions.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65754
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160329-161344544
- Created
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2016-03-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 21