An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching
- Creators
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Echenique, Federico
- Yariv, Leeat
Abstract
We present an experimental study of complex decentralized one-to-one matching markets, such as labor or marriage markets. In our experiments, subjects are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that are realized only when a certain period of market inactivity has elapsed. We find three main results. First, stable matches are the prevalent outcome. Second, in markets with multiple stable matches, the median stable match is selected most frequently. Third, the cardinal representation of ordinal preferences substantially impacts which stable match gets selected. Furthermore, the endogenous dynamic paths that lead to stability exhibit several persistent features.
Additional Information
August 17, 2012. We thank Drew Fudenberg, Jacob Goeree, Matthew Jackson, Muriel Niederle, Charles Plott, Andrew Schotter, and Alistair Wilson for useful conversations and suggestions. Gabriel Katz and Erik Madsen provided us with superb research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0963583) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.Attached Files
Accepted Version - an_experimental_study_of_decentralized_matching.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65543
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-133051578
- SES-0963583
- NSF
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- Created
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2016-03-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-26Created from EPrint's last_modified field