Published 2005
| Submitted
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The Banks set and the Uncovered Set in budget allocation problems
- Others:
- Austen-Smith, David
- Duggan, John
Abstract
We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among various regions, projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks set and the Uncovered Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be proper subsets of the set of all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their predictions. This contrasts with well-known "chaos theorems," which suggest that majority voting does not lead to any meaningful predictions when the policy space is multidimensional.
Additional Information
© 2005 Springer. This paper was written in fond memory of our dear friend and colleague Jeffrey Scot Banks. Financial support under NSF grant SES-0316493 is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Salvador Barbera for helpful conversations that helped spark some of the ideas behind the model we develop here, and David Austen-Smith for detailed comments on an earlier draft.Attached Files
Submitted - banks.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65454
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160317-143414501
- SES-0316493
- NSF
- Created
-
2016-03-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Studies in Choice and Welfare