Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published January 1984 | public
Journal Article

Spatial Equilibrium with Entry

Abstract

This paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote-maximizing third party. The resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the Hotelling "median" equilibrium. Established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election. This provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two-party systems. Namely that non-cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning.

Additional Information

© 1984 The Society for Economic Analysis Limited. Received April 1, 1982. Accepted February 1, 1983. The author gratefully acknowledges conversations with Howard Rosenthal, Keith Poole, and workshop participants at Washington University and Carnegie-Mellon University. Two referees also made helpful comments. The usual exemption from blame applies.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 17, 2023