Published March 2, 2016
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The Process of Choice in Guessing Games
- Creators
- Agranov, Marina
- Caplin, Andrew
- Tergiman, Chloe
Abstract
This paper employs a new experimental design to provide insight into strategic choice in one shot games. We incentivize and observe provisional choices in the 2/3 guessing game in the period after the structure of the game has been communicated. Early selections in this "strategic choice process" data provide insight into naive (L0) play, and support the standard assumption that such choices average 50. While average strategic sophistication rises over time, we identify significant individual differences in this respect. These differences appear to be broad-based: those whose strategic sophistication grows most in our experiment also perform best at separate learning tasks.
Additional Information
October 2010. Revised December 2010. We thank Jim Andreoni, Colin Camerer, Vince Crawford, Mark Dean, John Duffy, Martin Dufwenberg, Guillaume Frechette, Sen Geng, P.J. Healy, Daniel Martin, Rosemarie Nagel, Andy Schotter, Roberto Weber, the seminar participants at the Experimental Economics seminar at NYU, at the UCLA Theory Workshop, and at the Sauder School of Business at UBC for their input and guidance. Later published as "Naive Play and the Process of Choice in Guessing Games" in the Journal of the Economic Science Association, December 2015, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp 146-157, First online: 19 May 2015. doi:10.1007/s40881-015-0003-5.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1334.pdf
Updated - sswp1334R.pdf
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sswp1334.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 64842
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095936436
- Created
-
2016-03-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1334R