Published September 2014
| public
Journal Article
Risk attitudes and the stag-hunt game
- Creators
- Büyükboyacı, Mürüvvet
Abstract
A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent's action. Both players may want to obtain high payoff but uncertainty about the opponent's action may prevent them to take such strategic risk. This paper investigates how information about the risk attitude of an opponent affects a player's action choice in the stag-hunt game. I find that although a subject's propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent's risk attitude, it does not depend on her own risk attitude.
Additional Information
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. Received in revised form 1 June 2014; Accepted 20 June 2014; Available online 25 June 2014. I am grateful to Prof. Leeat Yariv and Prof. Thomas Palfrey for the stimulating discussions. I would like to thank the anonymous referee, participants at the ESA meetings in Tucson (2009) and Melbourne (2010) for their suggestions.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 51704
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20141113-102204505
- Created
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2014-11-13Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field