Published May 2014
| Published
Journal Article
Open
How Sharing Information Can Garble Experts' Advice
Abstract
We model the strategic provision of advice in environments where a principal's optimal action depends on an unobserved, binary state of interest. Experts receive signals about the state and each recommends an action. The principal and all experts dislike making errors in their decision and recommendations, respectively, but may have different costs of different errors. Is it in the principal's interest to let experts share information? Although sharing improves experts' ability to avoid errors, we identify a simple environment in which any principal, regardless of how he trades off the different errors, is worse off if he permits information sharing.
Additional Information
© 2014 American Economic Association. We thank Jeremy Bulow, Matthew O. Jackson, Paul Milgrom, and Michael Ostrovsky for helpful discussions. We are also grateful to Heski Bar-Isaac, Alex Frankel, and Ben Olken for their suggestions.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 48655
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20140818-113354575
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2014-08-19Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field