Published February 2014
| public
Journal Article
How long to Pareto efficiency?
- Creators
- Babichenko, Yakov
Abstract
We consider uncoupled dynamics (each player knows only his own payoff function) that reach outcomes that are Pareto efficient and individually rational. We show that in the worst case the number of periods it takes to reach these outcomes must be exponential in the number of players and hence the same number of periods it takes to reach Nash equilibria. For social welfare maximizing outcomes we provide a tight bound on the minimal number of steps required for reaching such an outcome by uncoupled dynamics.
Additional Information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Received: 3 August 2011; Accepted: 3 January 2013; Published online: 10 February 2013. This work is part of the author's Ph.D. thesis.The author wishes to thank his supervisor Sergiu Hart for his support and guidance and Noam Nisan for useful discussion. This research was partially supported by ERC Grant 0307950, and by ISF Grant 0397679.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 44522
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20140326-100632585
- 0307950
- European Research Council (ERC)
- 0397679
- Israel Science Foundation
- Created
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2014-03-27Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field