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Published 1985 | public
Book Section - Chapter

Revenue Generating Properties of Sealed-Bid Auctions: An Experimental Analysis of One-Price and Discriminative Processes

Abstract

The two most prominent forms of sealed-bid auctions are the discriminative pricing rule and the one-price (or "competitive") rule. With the discriminative rule such as that used by the U.S. Treasury for the sale of revenue bonds, each buyer pays a price equal to his/her accepted bid. That is, when a quantity Q is offered for sale, the Q highest bids are accepted and the successful buyer pays a price equal to his/her bid. With the one-price mechanism such as that used in French auctions of new stock issues, the successful buyer pays a price equal to the lowest accepted bid. That is, when a given quantity, Q, is offered for sale, the highest Q bids are accepted and each successful buyer pays a price equal to the lowest accepted bid.

Additional Information

© 1985 JAI Press Inc. The financial support of the National Science Foundation, the Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford is gratefully acknowledged.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
March 5, 2024