Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets: Traps and Misaligned Beliefs
Abstract
The capacity of markets to aggregate information has been conclusively demonstrated but he limitations of that capacity have still not been fully explored. In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of "information traps". These traps appear to be a sort of equilibrium in which information existing in the market does not become revealed in prices. The foundation for the equilibrium is a pattern of misaligned beliefs in which each person's actions are based upon mistaken beliefs about the information held by others. The mistakes, themselves, have a type of mutual compatibility and cannot become revealed by the price discovery process because individuals have no incentives or resources to adjust. Attempts to probe the nature of the phenomena involved two period markets with a contingent claim instruments, experienced participants, and unlimited short selling opportunities.
Additional Information
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this research which was provided by the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science and by the Gesellschaft der Freunde der Universitat Mannheim. Helpful comments were received from Rob Bloomfield, Dan Friedman, Susanne Prantl, and seminar participants at the ESA meeting 1996, EFA meeting 1997 and the Verein fur Socialpolitik meeting 1997.Attached Files
Accepted Version - wp1060.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 44357
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-134842763
- Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science
- Gesellschaft der Freunde der Universitat Mannheim
- Created
-
2014-03-27Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1060