Published September 2013
| public
Journal Article
Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games
- Creators
- Babichenko, Yakov
Abstract
We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cn log n steps for some constant c>0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1−e^(−c′n) for some constant c′>0.
Additional Information
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. Received 21 March 2012; Available online 23 May 2013. This paper is part of the Ph.D. research of the author at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author wishes to thank his supervisor, Sergiu Hart, for his support and guidance, Itai Arieli for useful discussions and comments, and anonymous referees for useful suggestions and remarks. The author would like to acknowledge financial support by ERC030-7950-411 and ISF039-7679-411.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 41965
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20131017-091722646
- 030-7950-411
- ERC
- 039-7679-411
- ISF
- Created
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2013-10-17Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field