Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence
Abstract
We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a decision maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the equilibrium of the game.We show that as the cost of information acquisition for one adversary increases, that person collects less evidence whereas the other adversary collects more evidence. We then test the results in a controlled laboratory setting. The behavior of subjects is close to the theoretical predictions. Mistakes are relatively infrequent (15%). They occur in both directions, with a higher rate of over-sampling (39%) than under-sampling (8%). The main difference with the theory is the smooth decline in sampling around the theoretical equilibrium. Comparative statics are also consistent with the theory, with adversaries sampling more when their own cost is low and when the other adversary's cost is high. Finally, there is little evidence of learning over the 40 matches of the experiment.
Additional Information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag. Received: 10 February 2010; Accepted: 24 February 2011; Published online: 29 March 2011. We thank M. Castro, S.H. Chew, G. Frechette, A. Gaduh, D. Houser, E. Kamenica, S. Singhal, the Associate Editor, two referees and the audiences at the CIRANO Political Economy workshop in Montreal, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the National University of Singapore, the North American meeting of the European Science Association, the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics and the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at USC for comments, Dustin Beckett for research assistance, and Chris Crabbe for developing the software. We also thank the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0617820 and SES-0962802), The Social Science Experimental Laboratory at Caltech, The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the LUSK Center for Real Estate, the Office of the Provost at the University of Southern California and the Microsoft Corporation. Formerly SSWP 1310.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 35814
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-011-0615-9
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20121205-095756144
- SES-0617820
- NSF
- SES-0962802
- NSF
- Caltech Social Science Experimental Laboratory
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- LUSK Center for Real Estate
- University of Southern California Office of the Provost
- Microsoft Corporation
- Created
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2012-12-05Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field