Analogy and falsification in Descartes' physics
- Creators
- Manning, Gideon
Abstract
In this paper I address Descartes' use of analogy in physics. First, I introduce Descartes' hypothetical reasoning, distinguishing between analogy and hypothesis. Second, I examine in detail Descartes' use of analogy to both discover causes and add plausibility to his hypotheses—even though not always explicitly stated, Descartes' practice assumes a unified view of the subject matter of physics as the extension of bodies in terms of their size, shape and the motion of their parts. Third, I present Descartes' unique "philosophy of analogy", where the absence of analogy serves as a criterion for falsifying proposed explanations in physics. I conclude by defending Descartes' philosophy of analogy by appeal to the value scientists assign to simplicity in their explanations.
Additional Information
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Received 19 July 2011. Revised 24 January 2012. Available online 19 March 2012. I have benefited from the advice and constructive suggestions of many friends and colleagues in writing this paper. I wish to thank Mordechai Feingold, Daniel Garber, Kristine Haugen, Chris Hitchcock, Mac Pigman and Jim Woodward, all of whom discussed issues related to analogy with me. I also wish to thank Roger Ariew, Paul Bartha, Mary Domski, Melissa Pastrana and two anonymous referees for this journal, all of whom provided me with significant feedback on the manuscript. I am very grateful to all the people mentioned here.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 31891
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.02.003
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20120613-103542875
- Created
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2012-06-14Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field