Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games
Abstract
Game theory is usually difficult to test in the field because predictions typically depend sensitively on features that are not controlled or observed. We conduct one such test using both laboratory and field data from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game. In this game, players pick positive integers and whoever chooses the lowest unique number wins. Equilibrium predictions are derived assuming Poisson distributed population uncertainty. The field and lab data show similar patterns. Despite various deviations from equilibrium, there is a surprising degree of convergence toward equilibrium. Some deviations can be rationalized by a cognitive hierarchy model.
Additional Information
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (August 2011): 1–33 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.3.3.1Attached Files
Published - AmericanEconomicJournalMicroeconomics3Aug2011.pdf
Supplemental Material - 2009-0095_app.pdf
Supplemental Material - 2009-0095_data.zip
Files
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 27718
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20111109-162429909
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2011-11-10Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field