Published April 2011
| public
Journal Article
Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups
- Creators
- Wang, Stephanie W.
Abstract
Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 × 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.
Additional Information
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. Received 7 September 2009; revised 18 November 2010; Accepted 24 November 2010. Available online 4 December 2010. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of The Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science. I thank Roland Benabou, Stephen Morris, Thomas Palfrey, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 27266
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.045
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20111018-081333167
- Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science
- Created
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2011-10-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field