Published December 2005
| public
Book Section - Chapter
Pricing for rate allocation in unicast service provisioning is informationally efficient
Abstract
We establish the informational efficiency of the pricing mechanism for unicast service provisioning, a class of decentralized resource allocation problems that arise in communication networks. We also present instances of network resource allocation problems where users are price takers and pricing mechanisms are not informationally efficient.
Additional Information
© 2005 IEEE. Issue Date: 12-15 Dec. 2005. Date of Current Version: 30 January 2006. This research was supported in part by ONR Grant N00014-03-1-0232, NSF Grant ECS-9979347 and NSF Grant CCR-0082784.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 25097
- DOI
- 10.1109/CDC.2005.1582309
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110825-130412068
- N00014-03-1-0232
- Office of Naval Research (ONR)
- ECS-9979347
- NSF
- CCR-0082784
- NSF
- Created
-
2011-08-26Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- IEEE Conference on Decision and Control & European Control