Published January 1993
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining
Abstract
A persistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to trial. Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the litigants-the longer the process continues, the lower their aggregate wealth. Although civil litigation is resolved by settlement in an estimated 95 percent of all disputes, what accounts for the failure of the remaining 5 percent to settle prior to trial?
Additional Information
© 1993 University of Chicago. We thank Douglas Laycock for his helpful comments. Jodi Gillis, Na-than Johnson, Ruth Silverman, and Arlene Simon provided valuable research assistance. Loewenstein's research was supported by the Russell Sage Foundation. Issacharoff's research was assisted by funding from the members of the Dean's Roundtable at the University of Texas School of Law and by the Shell Oil Foundation. Camerer's research was supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 90-23531.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 22133
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-102547293
- Russell Sage Foundation
- University of Texas School of Law
- Shell Oil Foundation
- SES 90-23531
- NSF
- Created
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2011-03-10Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field