Published July 1995
| public
Journal Article
Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments
- Creators
- Knez, Marc J.
-
Camerer, Colin F.
Abstract
We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of $10 to a respondent, who accepts or rejects it. If an offer is rejected, players receive a known outside option. Our proposers made simultaneous offers to two respondents, with outside options of $2 and $4. The rate of rejected offers was higher than in similar studies, around 50%, and persisted across five trials. Outside options seem to make players "egocentrically" apply different interpretations of the amount being divided, which creates persistent disagreement. And half of respondents demand more when they know other respondents are being offered more.
Additional Information
© 1995 Academic Press. Received July 15, 1994. Available online 24 April 2002. We thank participants in the Social Organization of Competition Workshop (Univ. of Chicago) and in the Behavioral Decision Research in Management Conference (Boston, May 1994) and the referees and the special issue editor Tom Palfrey for extremely helpful comments.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 22128
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-091232218
- Created
-
2011-02-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field