Published April 2007
| Accepted Version
Journal Article
Open
A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Creators
-
Echenique, Federico
- Yenmez, M. Bumin
Abstract
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.
Additional Information
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. Received 29 August 2005. Available online 12 September 2006. Preprint submitted to Games and Economic Behavior 19 June 2006. We thank an associate editor and two referees for their comments and suggestions. We thank Anna Bogomolnaia, Chris Chambers, Gary Lorden, Ilya Segal, and seminar audiences at the University of Arizona, Brown, Columbia, UCLA, Princeton, and Rice, for comments.Attached Files
Accepted Version - echenique-yenmez.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 20231
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20100929-160859854
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2010-09-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field